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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the transmission of confidential information over a κ-µ fading channel in
the presence of an eavesdropper, who also observes κ-µ fading. In particular, we obtain novel analytical
solutions for the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) and the lower bound of secure
outage probability (SOPL) for channel coefficients that are positive, real, independent and non-identically
distributed (i.n.i.d.). We also provide a closed-form expression for the probability of SPSC when the
µ parameter is assumed to only take positive integer values. We then apply the derived results to assess
the secrecy performance of the system in terms of the average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as a function
of the κ and µ fading parameters. We observed that for fixed values of the eavesdropper’s average SNR,
increases in the average SNR of the main channel produce a higher probability of SPSC and a lower
secure outage probability (SOP). It was also found that when the main channel experiences a higher
average SNR than the eavesdropper’s channel, the probability of SPSC improved while the SOP was
found to decrease with increasing values of κ and µ for the legitimate channel. The versatility of the
κ-µ fading model, means that the results presented in this paper can be used to determine the probability
of SPSC and SOPL for a large number of other fading scenarios such as Rayleigh, Rice (Nakagami-n),
Nakagami-m, One-Sided Gaussian and mixtures of these common fading models. Additionally, due to
the duality of the analysis of secrecy capacity and co-channel interference, the results presented here
will also have immediate applicability in the analysis of outage probability in wireless systems affected
by co-channel interference and background noise. To demonstrate the efficacy of the novel formulations
proposed here, we use the derived equations to provide a useful insight into the probability of SPSC for
a range of emerging applications such as cellular device-to-device, vehicle-to-vehicle and body centric
fading channels using data obtained from field measurements.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of smart devices, driven by applications such as the internet of things
(IoT) [1], device-to-device communications (D2D) [2] and wearable sensors [3]–[5], privacy
and security in wireless networking systems have once again been brought to the forefront. The
wireless medium utilized by each of these applications has an inherent broadcast nature that
makes it particularly susceptible to eavesdropping. Traditionally, these systems have attained
secure communications by employing classical cryptographic techniques; e.g., RSA or AES [6].
Unfortunately, these algorithms are entirely disjoint from the physical nature of the wireless
medium as they assume that the physical layer provides an error-free link. More recently, there
has been growing interest in information-theoretic security that exploits the random nature of
the wireless channel to guarantee the confidential transmission of messages [7]. It is widely
believed that using this type of approach will provide the strictest form of security for physical
layer communications [8].
The notion of perfect information-theoretic secrecy, i.e. I(M ;C) = 0, where I(·; ·) denotes
mutual information, M is the plane text message and C is its corresponding encryption, was
first presented by Shannon [9]. These ideas were later developed by Wyner [10], in which
he introduced the wiretap channel. Under the assumption that the wiretapper’s channel is a
probabilistically degraded version of the main channel, he studied the trade-off between the
information rate and the achievable secrecy level for a wiretap channel and showed that it is
possible to achieve a non-zero secrecy capacity. The secrecy capacity is defined as the largest
transmission rate from the source to the destination, at which the eavesdropper is unable to obtain
any information. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [11] later extended Wyner’s work to non-degraded channels
where the source has a common message for both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper
in addition to the confidential information for the intended recipient. Further developments were
made in [12], where it was shown that it is possible to achieve secure communication in the
presence of an eavesdropper over an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel provided
the channel capacity of the legitimate user was greater than the eavesdropper’s. The secrecy
capacity was then shown to be equal to the difference between the two channel capacities.
3The effect of fading on secrecy capacity was studied in [13]–[25]. Li et al. [13], Liang et
al. [14] and Gopal et al. [15] characterized the secrecy capacity of ergodic fading channels
and presented power and rate allocation schemes for secure communication. In [16] and [17],
the secrecy capacity for multiple access and broadcast channels was considered. Barros and
Rodrigues [18] showed that with signal fluctuation due to fading, information-theoretic security
is achievable even when the eavesdropper’s channel is of better average quality than that of the
intended recipient. They analyzed the SOP and the outage secrecy capacity for Rayleigh fading
channels when both the transmitter and the receiver are equipped with a single antenna in the
presence of a solitary eavesdropping party. A similar analysis for a system consisting of a single
antenna at the transmitter and multiple antennas at the receiver was presented in [19]. This
was extended to multiple eavesdropping parties in [20] and over Nakagami-m fading channels
in [21] and [22]. It was found that the SOP increases with the number of eavesdroppers and the
average SNR of the eavesdropper. The outage secrecy capacity was found to increase with the
Nakagami-m parameter, since an increase in m decreases the severity of fading in the channel.
More recently, the secrecy characteristics of other commonly encountered fading models such
as lognormal, Weibull and Rice have also been studied. For example, the probability of SPSC
of lognormal fading channels was studied in [23], while the probability of SPSC and SOPL
of Weibull fading channels was investigated in [24]. In [25] a secrecy capacity analysis over
Rice/Rice fading channels was conducted and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity was
determined.
While a number of important performance measures for κ-µ fading channels [26] have pre-
viously been developed such as energy detection based spectrum sensing [27]–[29] and outage
probability analysis in interference-limited scenarios with restricted values of µ [29], to the best
of the author’s knowledge the secrecy capacity of κ-µ fading channels has yet to be reported in
the open literature. Due to the equivalency pointed out in [30], the results presented here will also
have immediate applicability in the analysis of outage probability in cellular systems affected
by co-channel interference and background noise, and the calculation of outage probability in
interference-limited scenarios. Indeed the new equations proposed here provide an alternative,
4more general result than those presented in [29] (wherein the outage probability in interference-
limited scenarios is restricted to particular values of the µ parameter) and allow the calculation
of the relevant capacity formulations for arbitrary, real, positive values of the µ parameter.
Motivated by this, we analyze the secrecy capacity of κ-µ fading channels in which we assume
the eavesdropper to be passive and the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper and
the intended recipient are not available at the transmitter.
The main contributions of this paper are now listed as follows. Firstly, we derive novel
analytical expressions for the probability of SPSC and SOPL over κ-µ fading channels for
coefficients that are positive, real, i.n.i.d. for both the legitimate and non-legitimate parties.
Secondly, we provide an exact closed-form solution for the probability of SPSC over κ-µ fading
channels when the µ parameter is assumed to take positive integer values. These expressions have
been subsequently verified by reduction to known special cases. Thirdly and most importantly,
because the κ-µ fading model [26] contains a number of other well-known fading models
as special cases, the novel formulations presented in this paper unify the secrecy capacity
of Rayleigh, Rice (Nakagami-n), Nakagami-m and One-Sided Gaussian fading channels, and
their mixtures. Therefore they can be used to provide a useful insight into the secrecy capacity
of eavesdropping scenarios which undergo generalized fading conditions. Finally, we provide
an important application of these results to estimate the probability of SPSC of a number of
emerging wireless applications such as cellular device-to-device, vehicle-to-vehicle and body
centric communications using data obtained from real channel measurements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of the
κ-µ fading model. Section III explains the system model while Section IV provides the derivation
of novel analytical and closed form expressions for the probability of SPSC and SOPL. Section
V provides an overview of the model parameters required to obtain the secrecy capacity of the
common fading models derived from the κ-µ fading model; this is followed by some numerical
results. Section VI discusses some of the applications of this paper. Lastly, Section VII finishes
the paper with some concluding remarks.
5II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE κ-µ FADING MODEL
The κ-µ fading model was originally conceived for modeling the small-scale variations of
a fading signal under line-of-sight (LOS) conditions in non-homogeneous environments [26].
The κ-µ fading signal is a composition of clusters of multipath waves with scattered waves of
identical power with a dominant component of arbitrary power found within each cluster. The
received signal envelope, R, of the κ-µ fading model may be expressed in terms of the in-phase
and quadrature components of the fading signal such that [26, eq. 6]
R2 =
µ∑
i=1
(Xi + pi)
2 +
µ∑
i=1
(Yi + qi)
2 (1)
where µ is the number of multipath clusters, Xi and Yi are mutually independent Gaussian
random processes with mean E[Xi] = E[Yi] = 0 and variance E
[
Xi
2
]
= E
[
Yi
2
]
= σ2 (i.e.,
the power of the scattered waves in each clusters). Here pi and qi are the mean values of
the in-phase and quadrature phase components of multipath cluster i and d2 =
µ∑
i=1
pi
2 + qi
2.
Letting γ represent the instantaneous signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) of a κ-µ fading channel, then
its probability density function (PDF), fγ (γ), is obtained from the envelope PDF given in [26,
eq. 11] via a transformation of variables
(
r =
√
γ rˆ2/γ¯
)
as,
fγ (γ) =
µ(1 + κ)
µ+1
2 γ
µ−1
2 e
−µ(1+κ)γ
γ¯
κ
µ−1
2 γ¯
µ+1
2 eµκ
Iµ−1
(
2µ
√
κ (1 + κ) γ
γ¯
)
(2)
where κ > 0 is the ratio of the total power of the dominant components (d2) to that of the
scattered waves (2µσ2) in each of the clusters, µ > 0 is related to the number of multipath
clusters and is given by µ = E
2(γ)(1+2κ)
V(γ)(1+κ)2
where E(·) and V(·) denote the expectation and variance
operators, respectively, γ¯ = E (γ), is the average SNR and In(·) is the modified Bessel function
of the first kind and order n. As indicated in [26], it should be noted that the µ parameter can
take non-integer values which can be due to the non-zero correlation between the in-phase and
quadrature components of each cluster, non-zero correlation between the multipath clusters or
non-Gaussian nature of the in-phase and quadrature components. The cumulative distribution
6function (CDF) of γ can be obtained from [26, eq. 3] as,
Fγ (γ) = 1−Qµ
[√
2κµ,
√
2 (1 + κ)µγ
γ¯
]
(3)
where Q· (·, ·) is the generalized Marcum Q-function defined in [31, eq. 4.60] as,
QM (α, β) =
1
αM−1
∞
∫
β
xMe
−
(
x2+α2
2
)
IM−1 (αx) dx. (4)
The κ-µ distribution is a generalized fading model which also contains as special cases other
important distributions such as the Rice (µ = 1 and κ = K), Nakagami-m (κ → 0 and µ = m),
Rayleigh (µ = 1 and κ → 0) and One-Sided Gaussian (µ = 0.5 and κ → 0).
III. THE SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the system model of secure data transmission shown in Fig. 1. The legitimate
transmitter, Alice (node A), wishes to communicate secretly with the legitimate receiver, Bob
(node B), while a third party, Eve (node E), is attempting to eavesdrop. We assume that the
main and eavesdropper’s channels both experience κ-µ fading. Alice wishes to send a message,
wk = [w(1), w(2), w(3) . . .w(k)] to Bob. At the transmitter, the message wk is encoded into a
codeword, xn = [x(1), x(2), x(3) . . . x(n)], for transmission over the channel. The signal received
by Bob and Eve can be written as,
yM (i) = hM (i)x (i) + nM (i) (5)
yE (i) = hE (i) x (i) + nE (i) (6)
where hM(i) and hE(i) are the quasi-static κ-µ fading coefficients of the main and the eaves-
dropper’s channels respectively (i.e., hM(i) = hM∀i and hE(i) = hE∀i) and nM(i) and nE(i) are
the zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise random variables with unit variance
at Bob and Eve respectively.
We assume that the fading coefficients of Bob and Eve’s channels, although random, are
constant during the transmission of an entire codeword and independent of each other. Letting
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Fig. 1. The proposed system model.
P , NM and NE represent the average transmit power, noise power in the main channel, and noise
power in the eavesdropper’s channel respectively, then, the corresponding instantaneous SNR’s
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by, γM = P |hM |
2
NM
and γE = P |hE|
2
NE
,
while the average SNR’s are given by, γ¯M = PE(|hM |
2)
NM
and γ¯E = PE(|hE |
2)
NE
. Now let us consider
the channel components of Bob and Eve which are assumed to be i.n.i.d. random variables with
parameters {κM , µM , γ¯M} and {κE, µE, γ¯E}, respectively. The PDF’s of γM and γE can be
re-written from (2) as,
fγM (γM) =
µM(1 + κM)
µM+1
2 γM
µM−1
2 e
−µM (1+κM )γM
γM
κM
µM−1
2 γM
µM+1
2 eµMκM
IµM−1
(
2µM
√
κM (1 + κM) γM
γM
)
(7)
fγE (γE) =
µE(1 + κE)
µE+1
2 γE
µE−1
2 e
−µE(1+κE)γE
γE
κE
µE−1
2 γE
µE+1
2 eµEκE
IµE−1
(
2µE
√
κE (1 + κE) γE
γE
)
. (8)
Likewise, the CDF’s of γM and γE can be re-written from (3) as,
FγM (γM) = 1−QµM
[√
2κMµM ,
√
2 (1 + κM)µMγM
γM
]
(9)
FγE (γE) = 1−QµE
[√
2κEµE,
√
2 (1 + κE)µEγE
γE
]
. (10)
8IV. SECRECY CAPACITY IN κ-µ FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we derive an analytical expression for the SOPL. We also arrive at both an
analytical and closed form expression for the probability of SPSC over κ-µ fading channels.
Herein, it should be noted that we adopt the notation M/E to describe the fading conditions
experienced by the main channel (M), i.e. the intended recipient, and the eavesdropper (E).
For example κ-µ / κ-µ indicates that the main and eavesdropper’s channels are both subject
to i.n.i.d. κ-µ fading. Of course, because of the generality of the κ-µ fading model, M and E
can be readily interchanged with the Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Rice (Nakagami-n) and One-sided
Gaussian models which all appear as special cases of this fading model.
In passive eavesdropping scenarios, where the CSI of the eavesdropper and the intended
recipient are not available at the transmitter, perfect secrecy is not guaranteed. Hence, we adopt
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and SOP as useful secrecy metrics to characterize
the system performance. For the system under consideration, the capacity of the main channel
is given by CM = log2 (1 + γM) and the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel is given by
CE = log2 (1 + γE). From [8], we define the secrecy capacity, CS, for one realization of the
SNR pair (γM , γE) of the quasi-static complex fading wiretap channel as,
CS =

 log2 (1 + γM)− log2 (1 + γE) , (γM > γE)0 , (γM ≤ γE) (11)
A. SOP Analysis
The outage probability of secrecy capacity is the probability that the instantaneous secrecy
capacity falls below a target secrecy rate RS (RS ≥ 0) and is defined in [8] as,
Pout (RS) = Pr (CS ≤ RS) . (12)
Performing the necessary mathematical manipulations, we obtain,
Pout (RS) = Pr
[
γM ≤ eRS (1 + γE)− 1
] (13)
9which can then be expressed as,
Pout (RS) =
µE(1 + κE)
µE+1
2
κE
µE−1
2 γE
µE+1
2 eµEκE
∞∫
0
γE
µE−1
2 e
−µE(1+κE)γE
γE IµE−1
(
2µE
√
κE (1 + κE) γE
γE
)
×
(
1−QµM
(√
2κMµM ,
√
2 (1 + κM) (eRS (1 + γE)− 1)µM
γM
))
dγE. (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.
At present, due to the complicated form of the integral contained in (14) it is not possible to
obtain a closed-form expression for the SOP, therefore, we derive the lower bound of SOP as
follows [24],
Pout (RS) = Pr
[
γM ≤ eRS (1 + γE)− 1
]
≥ SOPL = Pr
[
γM ≤ eRSγE
]
.
(15)
Consider the Marcum-Q function in (14). This can be re-written as,
QµM
(√
2κMµM ,
√
2 (1 + κM)µMeRSγE
γM
(
1 +
eRS − 1
eRSγE
))
γE→
=
∞
QµM
(√
2κMµM ,
√
2 (1 + κM)µMeRSγE
γM
)
. (16)
Now, using (8), (9) and (16) the lower bound of SOP is obtained as,
SOPL =
µE(1 + κE)
µE+1
2
κE
µE−1
2 γE
µE+1
2 eµEκE
∞∫
0
γE
µE−1
2 e
−µE(1+κE)γE
γE IµE−1
(
2µE
√
κE (1 + κE) γE
γE
)
×
(
1−QµM
(√
2κMµM ,
√
2 (1 + κM) (eRSγE)µM
γM
))
dγE. (17)
The solution for (17) can be obtained via the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For the arbitrary real and positive µM , µE, κM and κE (17) can be evaluated
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as,
SOPL =
βE
µE+1
2
αE
µE−1
2 eαE
∞∑
k=0
(√
αEβE
)µE−1+2kΓ (µE + k)
k!Γ (µE + k)
(
1
βE
)µE+k
− βE
µE+1
2
αE
µE−1
2 eαE
×
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(√
αEβE
)µE−1+2k(2αM)l(βMeRS)µM+lΓ (µE + k + µM + l)
k!Γ (µE + k) l!Γ (µM + l) 2leαM (µE + k) (βMeRS + βE)
µE+k+µM+l
× 2F1
(
1, µE + k + µM + l;µE + k + 1;
βE
βMeRS + βE
)
(18)
where a = 1/γ¯M , b = 1/γ¯E, βM = (κM+1)aµM , βE = (κE+1)bµE, αM = κMµM , αE = κEµE
and 2F1(· , · ; · ; ·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function [32].
Proof: See Appendix B.
B. SPSC Analysis
In this subsection we examine the condition for the existence of strictly positive secrecy
capacity. This occurs as a special case of the secrecy outage probability when the target secrecy
rate, RS = 0. According to [8] the probability of non zero secrecy capacity is defined as,
P0 = Pr (CS > 0) = Pr (γM > γE) (19)
Performing the necessary mathematical manipulations, the probability of SPSC can be expressed
as,
Pα =
µE(1 + κE)
µE+1
2
κE
µE−1
2 γE
µE+1
2 eµEκE
∞∫
0
γE
µE−1
2 e
−µE(1+κE)γE
γE IµE−1
(
2µE
√
κE (1 + κE) γE
γE
)
×QµM
(√
2κMµM ,
√
2 (1 + κM)µMγE
γM
)
dγE. (20)
Proof: See Appendix C.
As can be seen, the solution obtained for (20) depends on the parameters µM and µE and
thus the following propositions are valid.
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Proposition 2. For the arbitrary real and positive µM and µE , (20) can be evaluated as,
Pα =
βE
µE+1
2
αE
µE−1
2 eαE
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(√
αEβE
)µE−1+2k(2αM)lβMµM+lΓ (µE + k + µM + l)
k!Γ (µE + k) l!Γ (µM + l) 2leαM (µE + k) (βM + βE)
µE+k+µM+l
× 2F1
(
1, µE + k + µM + l;µE + k + 1;
βE
βM + βE
)
(21)
where a = 1/γ¯M , b = 1/γ¯E, βM = (κM+1)aµM , βE = (κE+1)bµE, αM = κMµM , αE = κEµE
and 2F1(· , · ; · ; ·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function [32].
Proof: See Appendix D.
Proposition 3. For integer values of µM and µE, an exact closed form solution for (20) is
obtained as
P0 = 1− ´P + exp
(
−A2r+B2r−1
2R
) v∑
m=−µ
(
A
Br
)m
Im
(
AB
R
)
×


µ∑
k=1

 v + k
k +m

 rv−k+1R−v−k−1 − v∑
j=1

 j
m

 rj−1R−j−1

 (22)
where,
P´ = Q1
(√
2κEaµEµM (1 + κM)
(b (1 + κE)µE) + (a (1 + κM )µM)
,
√
2κMbµEµM (1 + κE)
(b (1 + κE)µE) + (a (1 + κM)µM)
)
−
(
b (1 + κE)µE
(b (1 + κE)µE) + (a (1 + κM)µM)
)
exp
(
−aκEµMµE (1 + κM) + bκMµMµE (1 + κE)
(b (1 + κE)µE) + (a (1 + κM)µM)
)
× I0
(
2µEµM
√
abκMκE (1 + κE) (1 + κM)
(b (1 + κE)µE) + (a (1 + κM)µM)
)
;
r =
√
(1+κM )µMa
(1+κE)µEb
; A =
√
2κEµE; B =
√
2κMµM ; µ = µE − 1; v = µM − 1; and R = r + r−1
Proof: See Appendix E.
V. SPECIAL CASES AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we verify the novel analytical and closed-form expressions of SPSC derived
above by reducing them to a number of known special cases. We also use the formulations to
12
provide a useful insight into the behavior of the SOPL and SPSC as a function of the fading
parameters of the legitimate and eavesdroppers channels.
A. Some Special Cases
As discussed previously, because of the generality of the κ-µ fading model the results presented
here encompass the probability of SPSC for a wide range of fading channels. For the reader’s
convenience a detailed list, along with the corresponding parameter values, is presented in Table
I. We now discuss a few examples from Table I.
1) Rice / Rice and Rayleigh / Rayleigh: As shown in Table I, to obtain the probability of
SPSC for the case when both the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel undergo Rician
fading (i.e. a Rice / Rice fading scenario), we substitute µM = µE = 1 into (21) and/or (22) in
which case these reduce to
P0 =
(1 + κE)
γE eκE
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(√
κE (1 + κE) b
)2k
k!Γ (1 + k)
(2κM)
l
l!Γ (1 + l) 2leκM
× ((κM + 1) a)
1+lΓ (2 + k + l)
(1 + k) ((κM + 1) a + (κE + 1) b)
2+k+l 2
F1
(
1, 2 + k + l; 2 + k;
(κE + 1) b
(κM + 1) a+ (κE + 1) b
)
(23)
and
P0 = 1−Q1
(√
2κEa (1 + κM)
b (1 + κE) + a (1 + κM)
,
√
2κMb (1 + κE)
b (1 + κE) + a (1 + κM)
)
+
(
b (1 + κE)
b (1 + κE) + a (1 + κM)
)
e
(
−
akE(1+κM )+bκM (1+κE)
b(1+κE)+a(1+κM )
)
I0
(
2
√
abκMκE (1 + κE) (1 + κM)
b (1 + κE) + a (1 + κM )
)
(24)
which are in exact agreement with the result reported in [25, eq. 10] and are illustrated visually
in Fig. 2. Of course letting κM = κE = 0, then
P0 =
γM
γM + γE
(25)
which matches exactly with that given in [18, eq. 5] for a Rayleigh / Rayleigh fading scenario.
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TABLE I
PARAMETER SUBSTITUTION TO OBTAIN SECRECY CAPACITY OF SPECIAL CASES DERIVED FROM THE κ-µ FADING MODEL
Scenario Parameters to be substituted in (21) and/or (22)
Rice / Rice µM = µE = 1 ; κM > 0 and κE > 0
Nakagami-m / Nakagami-m µM = µE > 0 ; κM → 0 and κE → 0
Rayleigh / Rayleigh µM = µE = 1 ; κM → 0 and κE → 0
One-Sided Gaussian / One-Sided Gaussian µM = µE = 0.5 ; κM → 0 and κE → 0
κ-µ / Rice µM > 0 ; κM > 0 ; µE = 1 and κE > 0
κ-µ / Nakagami-m µM > 0 ; κM > 0 ; µE > 0 and κE → 0
κ-µ / Rayleigh µM > 0 ; κM > 0 ; µE = 1 and κE → 0
κ-µ / One-Sided Gaussian µM > 0 ; κM > 0 ; µE = 0.5 and κE → 0
Rice / κ-µ µM = 1 ; κM > 0 ; µE > 0 and κE > 0
Rice / Rayleigh µM = 1 ; κM > 0 ; µE = 1 and κE → 0
Rice / Nakagami-m µM = 1 ; κM > 0 ; µE > 0 and κE → 0
Rice/ One-Sided Gaussian µM = 1 ; κM > 0 ; µE = 0.5 and κE → 0
Nakagami-m / κ-µ µM > 0 and κM → 0 ; µE > 0 and κE > 0
Nakagami-m / Rice µM > 0 and κM → 0 ; µE = 1 and κE > 0
Nakagami-m / Rayleigh µM > 0 and κM → 0 ; µE = 1 and κE → 0
Nakagami-m / One-Sided Gaussian µM > 0 and κM → 0 ; µE = 0.5 and κE → 0
Rayleigh / κ-µ µM = 1 ; κM → 0 ; µE > 0 and κE > 0
Rayleigh / Rice µM = 1 ; κM → 0 ; µE = 1 and κE > 0
Rayleigh / Nakagami-m µM = 1 ; κM → 0 ; µE > 0 and κE → 0
Rayleigh / One-Sided Gaussian µM = 1 ; κM → 0 ; µE = 0.5 and κE → 0
One-Sided Gaussian / κ-µ µM = 0.5 ; κM → 0 ; µE > 0 and κE > 0
One-Sided Gaussian / Rice µM = 0.5 ; κM → 0 ; µE = 1 and κE > 0
One-Sided Gaussian / Rayleigh µM = 0.5 ; κM → 0 ; µE = 1 and κE → 0
One-Sided Gaussian / Nakagami-m µM = 0.5 ; κM → 0 ; µE > 0 and κE → 0
2) Nakagami-m / Nakagami-m: By letting κM → 0 and κE → 0 into (21) and/or (22), we
obtain the probability of SPSC for the scenario where both the legitimate and non-legitimate
users channels undergo Nakagami-m fading. As shown in Fig. 2, our results have been compared
with that reported in [21, eq. 8]. It should be noted that the expression proposed in [21, eq. 8]
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Fig. 2. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus γ¯M . Lines represent equation (21) and (22) for the special case of
Rice (µM = µE = 1; κM = 15, κE = 12); Nakagami-m (κM → 0 and κE → 0; µM = µE = 2) and Rayleigh fading (κM →
0 and κE → 0; µM = µE = 1). Triangle markers represent [25, eq. 10] with κa = 15, κb = 12 for Rice; circle markers [21, eq.
8] with m = 2; N = 1 for Nakagami-m and square markers [18, eq. 5] for Rayleigh fading.
is valid only for identical fading parameters of the main and the eavesdroppers channels and
for integer values of the shape parameter, m (or equivalently µ when κ → 0) when a single
eavesdropper is considered whereas the equation proposed here is valid for any positive real
value of the µ parameter. As shown in Fig. 2, for the case of integer µM and µE, the results
presented here are in exact agreement with those presented in [21].
3) Other Fading Scenarios: In a similar manner, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
for several different fading combinations, most of which have not been reported previously in
the open literature, can be obtained from Table I. Fig. 3 shows the shape of probability of SPSC
for a selection of these scenarios, namely the Nakagami-m / One-Sided Gaussian (κM → 0 ;
µM = 1.2 ; µE = 0.5 and κE → 0), κ-µ / One-Sided Gaussian (µM = 1.2 ; κM = 5 ; µE = 0.5
and κE → 0) , One-Sided Gaussian / One-Sided Gaussian (µM = µE = 0.5 ; κM → 0 and κE
→ 0) and Rice / Nakagami-m (µM = 1 ; κM = 5 ; µE = 1.2 and κE → 0 ).
B. Numerical Results
Here, we discuss the behavior of P0 and SOPL as a function of parameters {κM , µM , γ¯M}
and {κE, µE , γ¯E}. Let B represent the ratio of the average SNR of the main channel to that of
15 
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Fig. 3. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus γ¯M for the special case of Nakagami-m / One-Sided Gaussian (κM
→ 0; µM = 1.2; µE = 0.5 and κE → 0), κ-µ / One-Sided Gaussian (κM = 5; µM = 1.2; κE → 0 and µE = 0.5), One-Sided
Gaussian / One-Sided Gaussian (µM = µE = 0.5; κM → 0 and κE → 0) and Rice / Nakagami-m (κM = 5; µM = 1; κE →
0 and µE = 1.2)
the eavesdropper’s channel i.e, B = γ¯M/γ¯E and r represent the ratio, κE/κM . For the figures
shown in this section, we set RS = 1 dB, µM = 1.4 and µE = 1.2. Four example profiles for
the probability of SPSC and SOPL are illustrated in Fig. 4.
From these figures, we observe that the probability of SPSC increases and the secrecy outage
probability decreases as B increases. This is because larger values of B indicate that the signal
quality of the main channel is better than that of the eavesdropper’s channel. From Figs. 4(a)
and (b), we observe that the probability of SPSC is non-zero even when B < 1. Furthermore,
P0 increases as κM , the main channel’s fading parameter, increases, while for a fixed κM with
γ¯M < γ¯E, P0 increases as κE decreases. It can be seen from Figs. 4(c) and (d) that the SOP
decreases as κM increases. Additionally, for a fixed κM and when B < 1, the SOP decreases
as κE decreases. Similar observations are made when κM and κE are set and µM and µE are
varied.
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Fig. 4. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity with (a) κM = 4 and (b) κM = 10, and the secrecy outage probability
with (c) κM = 4 and (d) κM = 10.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF SPSC FOR DEVICES OPERATING IN κ-µ FADING CHANNELS
To illustrate the utility of the new equations proposed here, we now analyze the probability
of SPSC for a number of emerging applications such as cellular device-to-device, body area
network (BAN) and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications using channel data obtained from
field trials. For all of the measurements conducted in this study, we considered a three node
system which consisted of Alice, herein denoted node A, which acted as the transmitter and
also Bob (node B) and Eve (node E) which acted as the receivers. Each of the nodes, A, B
and E, consisted of an ML5805 transceiver, manufactured by RFMD. The transceiver boards
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were interfaced with a PIC32MX which acted as a baseband controller and allowed the analog
received signal strength (RSS) to be sampled with a 10-bit quantization depth. For all of the
experiments conducted here, node A was configured to output a continuous wave signal with a
power level of +21 dBm at 5.8 GHz while nodes B and E sampled the channel at a rate of 1 kHz.
The antennas used by the transmitter and the receivers were +2.3 dBi sleeve dipole antennas
(Mobile Mark model PSKN3-24/55S).
A. Device-to-Device Scenario
The first set of measurements considered cellular device-to-device communications channels
operating at 5.8 GHz in an indoor environment. The experiments were conducted in a large
seminar room located on the first floor of the ECIT building at Queen’s University Belfast in the
United Kingdom. The seminar room had dimensions of 7.92 m x 12.58 m x 2.75 m and contained
a number of chairs, some desks constructed from medium density fiberboard, a projector and
a white board. For these measurements, the antennas were housed in a compact acrylonitrile
butadiene styrene (ABS) enclosure (107 x 55 x 20 mm). This setup was representative of the
form factor of a smart phone which allowed the user to hold the device as they normally would
to make a voice call. Each antenna was securely fixed to the inside of the enclosure using a
small strip of Velcro R©. The antennas were connected using low-loss coaxial cables to nodes A,
B and E.
The experiment was performed when the room was unoccupied except for the test subjects
holding the devices. As shown in Fig. 5(a), this particular scenario considered three persons
carrying nodes A, B and E who were positioned at points X, Y and Z respectively. The three
test subjects using nodes A, B and E were adult males of height 1.72 m, 1.84 m and 1.83 m;
mass 80 kg, 92 kg and 74 kg, respectively. During the measurement trial, all three persons were
initially stationary and had the hypothetical user equipment (UE) positioned at their heads. The
persons at points Y and Z were then instructed to move around randomly within a circle of
radius 0.5 m from their starting points while imitating a voice call. A total of 74763 samples of
the received signal power were obtained and used for parameter estimation.
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Figs. 6(a) and (b) show the empirical PDF of the signal envelope for Bob and Eve compared to
the κ-µ PDF given in [26, eq. 11] for the D2D channel measurements. All parameter estimates for
the κ-µ fading model were obtained using the lsqnonlin function available in the Optimization
toolbox of Matlab along with the κ-µ PDF given in [26, eq. 11]. It should be noted that to remove
the impact of any shadowing processes, which are not accounted for in the κ-µ fading model,
the data sets were normalized to their respective local means prior to parameter estimation. To
determine the window size for extraction of the local mean signal, the raw data was visually
inspected and overlaid with the local mean signal for differing window sizes. For the D2D
channel data, a smoothing window of 500 samples was considered. As we can quite clearly see,
from Figs. 6(a) and (b), the envelope PDF of the κ-µ fading model provides an excellent fit to
the D2D data. To allow the reader to reproduce these plots, parameter estimates for all three
measurement scenarios are given in Table II.
Using the parameter estimates obtained from the field trials, Figs. 6(c) depicts the estimated
probability of SPSC versus γ¯M for selected values of γ¯E for the measured D2D channel. In this
instance, it can be seen that the estimates for κ of the main and eavesdropper’s channels are
comparable and also greater than 0, suggesting that a dominant component existed for both. We
also observe that the parameter estimates for µM and µE are both quite close to 1, suggesting that
a single multipath cluster contributes to the signal received by both Bob (node B) and Eve (node
E) and thus this fading scenario is quite close to the Rician case. For this fading environment,
we note that P0 increases as the average SNR of the main channel increases. Furthermore, for
a fixed γ¯M , the channel becomes more susceptible to eavesdropping as the average SNR of the
eavesdropper’s channel increases.
B. Body Area Network Scenario
The second set of measurements considered on-body communications channels operating at
5.8 GHz as found in body area networks. The experiment was performed in the same seminar
room discussed above which was unoccupied except for the test subject on which the on-body
nodes were placed. For this scenario, to maximize coupling across the body surface, the antennas
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Fig. 5. Seminar room environment showing the position of nodes A, B and E for (a) D2D scenario (b) on-body scenario.
were mounted normal to the torso of an adult male of height 1.83 m and mass 74 kg. Node
A was positioned at the front central chest region at a height of 1.42 m while nodes B and E
were placed on the rear of the test subject at the central waist region at a height of 1.15 m and
the right back-pocket at a height of 0.92 m, respectively. The measurements considered the case
when the hypothetical BAN user walked along a straight line within the large room, covering a
total distance of 9 m as shown in Fig. 5(b). For the BAN scenario, a total of 19260 samples of
the received signal power were obtained and used for parameter estimation.
Figs. 6(d) and (e) show the empirical PDF of the signal envelope for Bob and Eve, again com-
pared to the κ-µ PDF given in [26, eq. 11]. Identical to the analysis of the D2D measurements,
the optimum window size was determined from the raw channel data. In this case a smoothing
window of 100 samples was used. Again, the κ-µ PDF was found to provide an excellent fit
to the empirical data for both Bob and Eve. Interestingly for the BAN configuration considered
here, the estimated κ parameter of the eavesdropper’s channel was greater than that of the main
channel, while for the estimated µ parameters, the converse situation was true (Table II). Fig.
6(f) shows the probability of SPSC versus γ¯M with selected values of γ¯E for the measured BAN
channel. It can be quite clearly seen that for fixed γ¯E, the probability of SPSC improves as the
legitimate channel experiences a higher average SNR.
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TABLE II
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE κ− µ FADING MODEL OBTAINED FROM THE FIELD MEASUREMENTS
Fading Channel κˆM µˆM ˆ¯rM κˆE µˆE ˆ¯rE
D2D 1.07 0.91 1.22 1.11 0.92 1.19
On-Body 2.92 0.75 1.17 3.60 0.67 1.17
V2V 5.02 0.70 1.04 7.17 0.60 1.03
C. Vehicle-to-Vehicle Scenario
The third set of measurements considered vehicle-to-vehicle communication channels operat-
ing at 5.8 GHz. The experiments were conducted in a business district environment in the Titanic
Quarter of Belfast, United Kingdom. As shown in Fig. 7, the area consisted of a straight road
with a number of office buildings nearby. For this particular scenario, nodes A, B and E were
placed on the center of the dash boards of three different vehicles; namely, a Vauxhall (Opel
in Europe) Zafira SRi, a Vauxhall Astra SRi and a Hyundai Getz. The initial positions of the
vehicles are shown in Fig. 7. The measurements began when the vehicles that contained nodes
A and B started approaching one another at a speed of 30mph. During these measurements the
vehicle containing node E remained parked (with the driver still seated inside) on the side of
the road as indicated in Fig. 7. It should be noted that all of the channel measurements made
in this scenario were performed during off-peak traffic hours and were subject to perturbations
caused by the driver, movement of the nearby pedestrians and other vehicular traffic. A total of
56579 samples of the received signal power were obtained and used for parameter estimation.
Figs. 6(g) and (h) show the empirical PDF of the signal envelope for Bob and Eve compared to
the κ-µ PDF. Similar to the analysis of the D2D and BAN measurements, the optimum window
size was determined from the raw channel data. The local mean for the V2V measurements was
calculated over 200 samples. From these figures we can see that the PDF of the κ-µ fading
model provides a very good approximation to the V2V data. From Table II, it can be seen that
the estimates of κ for the main and the eavesdropper’s channels are greater than 0 whilst the
estimated µ parameters are less than 1, suggesting that a dominant component exists and that
these channels suffer less from multipath. We also observe that the estimated κ parameter of the
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Fig. 6. Empirical envelope PDF of node B and E compared to the κ-µ PDF given in [26, eq. 11] and the probability of SPSC
versus γ¯M with selected values of γ¯E for D2D, BAN and V2V channel measurements, respectively.
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Fig. 7. Satellite view of measurement environment showing the position of nodes A, B and E for V2V scenario. The vehicle
with node E remained parked on the side of the road and was oriented such that it faced directly towards node A. Arrows
indicate the front of the car.
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eavesdropper’s channel was greater than that of the legitimate channel, the estimated µ parameter
of the main channel was only marginally greater than that of the eavesdropper’s channel. Fig.
6(i) depicts the probability of SPSC versus γ¯M with selected values of γ¯E for the measured V2V
channel. As observed for the previous two scenarios, the probability of SPSC is improved when
γ¯M > γ¯E.
VII. CONCLUSION
Novel analytical and closed-form expressions for the probability of SPSC and SOPL of the
recently proposed κ-µ fading model have been presented. Specifically, the analytical expres-
sions have been derived for positive, real, i.n.i.d. κ-µ channel variables in the presence of an
eavesdropper. We have also arrived at an exact closed form expression for the probability of
SPSC for integer values of µM and µE. Based on these results we have provided a useful
insight into the behavior of SPSC and SOPL as a function of parameters {κM , µM , γ¯M}
and {κE, µE, γ¯E}. The analytical and closed form expressions have been validated through
reduction to known special cases. As the κ-µ fading model is a very general statistical model
that includes many well-known distributions, the new equations derived in this paper will find
use in characterizing the secrecy performance of several different fading channels (see Table
I). Moreover, the results presented here will also find immediate application in the analysis
of outage probability in wireless systems affected by co-channel interference and background
noise, and the calculation of outage probability in interference-limited scenarios. Finally, we
have illustrated the utility of the new formulations by investigating the probability of SPSC
based on real channel measurements conducted for a diverse range of wireless applications such
as cellular device-to-device, vehicle-to-vehicle and body centric fading channels. It is also worth
highlighting that all of the expressions presented in this paper can be easily evaluated using
functions available in mathematical software packages such as Mathematica and Matlab.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQUATION (14)
From (13) we have,
Pout (RS) = Pr
[
γM ≤ eRS (1 + γE)− 1
]
=
∞
∫
0
fγE (γE)
[
eRS (1+γE)−1
∫
0
fγM (γM) dγM
]
dγE
=
∞
∫
0
fγE (γE)
[
FγM
(
eRS (1 + γE)− 1
)]
dγE (26)
Substituting (8) and (9) in (26) we obtain (14).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
An analytical expression for (17) can be derived by expressing the generalized Marcum Q-
function and the modified Bessel function of the first kind according to [33, eq. 16] and [34]
as, follows,
Qm (a, b) =
∞∑
l=0
a2lΓ
(
m+ l, b
2
2
)
l!Γ (m+ l) 2le
a2
2
(27)
Iv(x) =
∞∑
k=0
(
x
2
)v+2k
k!Γ (v + k + 1)
(28)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function, Γ(·, ·) is the incomplete gamma function. By following the
procedure proposed in [33, Lemma 1], the following upper bound is obtained for the truncation
error of the Marcum Q- function representation in (27),
t ≤
m− 1
2∑
l=1
l−1∑
k=0
(−1)lbk(l − k)l−1
[
1− (−1)ke2ab
]
k!
√
pi2l−k−
1
2a2l−k−1e
(a+b)2
2
+Q (a+ b) +Q (b− a)−
p∑
l=0
a2lΓ
(
m+ l, b
2
2
)
l!Γ (m+ l) 2le
a2
2
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By substituting (27) and (28) in (17) we obtain,
SOPL =
βE
µE+1
2
αE
µE−1
2 eαE
∞∑
k=0
(√
αEβE
)µE−1+2k
k!Γ (µE + k)
∞
∫
0
γE
µE+k−1e−βEγEdγE − βE
µE+1
2
αE
µE−1
2 eαE
×
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(√
αEβE
)µE−1+2k(2αM)l
k!Γ (µE + k) l!Γ (µM + l) 2leαM
∞
∫
0
γE
µE+k−1e−βEγEΓ
(
µM + l, βMe
RSγE
)
dγE
(29)
where a = 1/γ¯M , b = 1/γ¯E, βM = (κM + 1)aµM , βE = (κE + 1)bµE , αM = κMµM and
αE = κEµE. Notably, the integrals in (29) are identical to [32, eq. 3.381,4] and [32, eq. 6.455]
given by,
∞
∫
0
xv−1e−µxdx =
1
µv
Γ (v) [Re µ > 0, Re v > 0] (30)
and
∞
∫
0
xµ−1e−βxΓ (v, αx) dx =
αvΓ (µ+ v)
µ(α+ β)µ+v
2F1
(
1, µ+ v;µ+ 1;
β
α + β
)
[Re (α + β) > 0, Re µ > 0, Re (µ+ v) > 0] (31)
We then substitute (30) and (31) in (29) to obtain (18).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF EQUATION (20)
From (19) we have,
P0 = Pr (γM > γE)
=
∞
∫
0
fγE (γE)
[
∞
∫
γE
fγM (γM) dγM
]
dγE
=
∞
∫
0
fγE (γE) [1− FγM (γE)] dγE. (32)
Substituting (8) and (9) in (32) we obtain (20).
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
An analytical expression for the probability of SPSC is obtained by substituting (27) and (28)
in (20) as follows,
P0 =
βE
µE+1
2
αE
µE−1
2 eαE
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
(√
αEβE
)µE−1+2k(2αM)l
k!Γ (µE + k) l!Γ (µM + l) 2leαM
×
∞
∫
0
γE
µE+k−1e−βEγEΓ (µM + l, βMγE) dγE (33)
Notably, the above integral is identical to [32, eq. 6.455] given by,
∞
∫
0
xµ−1e−βxΓ (v, αx) dx =
αvΓ (µ+ v)
µ(α+ β)µ+v
2F1
(
1, µ+ v;µ+ 1;
β
α + β
)
[Re (α + β) > 0, Re µ > 0, Re (µ+ v) > 0] (34)
We then substitute (34) in (33) to obtain (21).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
From [35, eq. 2.5],
Pµ,v (A,B; r) = A
−µB−v
∞
∫
0
xµ+1e
−
(
x2+A2
2
)
Iµ (Ax) dx
rx
∫
0
yv+1e
−
(
y2+B2
2
)
Iv (By) dy. (35)
Using the definition of the Marcum Q-function given in (4) in (35), we obtain,
Pµ,v (A,B; r) = 1− A−µ
∞
∫
0
xµ+1e
−
(
x2+A2
2
)
Iµ (Ax)Qv+1 (B, rx) dx. (36)
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Now letting x =
√
2µE(1+κE)γE
γE
and performing the necessary transformation of variables we
obtain,
Pµ,v (A,B; r) = 1−A−µe−A
2
2
∞
∫
0
2
µ
2
(
µE (1 + κE)
γE
)µ
2
+1
γE
µ
2 e
−µE(1+κE)γE
γE
× Iµ
(
A
√
2µE (1 + κE) γE
γE
)
Qv+1
(
B, r
√
2µE (1 + κE) γE
γE
)
dγE. (37)
Comparing (37) with (20) and with the appropriate variable substitutions (see Proposition 3),
we obtain:
Pµ,v (A,B; r) =1− µE(1 + κE)
µE+1
2
κE
µE−1
2 γE
µE+1
2 eµEκE
∞
∫
0
γE
µE−1
2 e
−µE(1+κE)γE
γE
×IµE−1
(
2µE
√
κE (1 + κE) γE
γE
)
QµM
(√
2κMµM ,
√
2µM (1 + κM) γE
γM
)
dγE
=1− P0.
(38)
From [35, eq. 3.16], we have,
Pµ,v (A,B; r) = P0,0 (A,B; r) + exp
(
−A
2r +B2r−1
2R
) v∑
m=−µ
(
A
Br
)m
Im
(
AB
R
)
×


µ∑
k=1

 v + k
k +m

 rv−k+1R−v−k−1 − v∑
j=1

 j
m

 rj−1R−j−1

 . (39)
From [35, eq. 3.5], we have,
P0,0 (A,B; r) = Q
(
Ar√
1 + r2
,
B√
1 + r2
)
− (1 + r2)−1 exp [−A2r2 +B2
2 (1 + r2)
]
I0
(
ABr
1 + r2
)
. (40)
Letting P´ = P0,0 (A,B; r) and combining (38), (39) and (40) we obtain (22). Note that [35]
uses lower-case symbols (a, b) and we use upper-case symbols (A, B). This is because we define
a = 1
γ¯M
and b = 1
γ¯E
.
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